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1	UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
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3	UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
4	v. 19 CR 716 (DLC) Telephone Conference
5	TELEMAQUE LAVIDAS,
6	Defendant.
7	x
8	New York, N.Y. July 2, 2020
9	11:00 a.m.
10	Before:
11	HON. DENISE COTE,
12	District Judge
13	APPEARANCES
14	AUDREY STRAUSS,
15	Acting United States Attorney for the Southern District of New York
16	RICHARD A. COOPER DANIEL TRACER
17	DREW SKINNER Assistant United States Attorneys
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19	DECHERT LLP Attorneys for Defendant
20	BY: JONATHAN R. STREETER
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(The Court and all parties appearing telephonically) THE COURT: I'm going to take appearances first, and then I'm going to create a record of the situation in which we find ourselves. I'll take an appearance from the government. Daniel Tracer, for the government. Good MR. TRACER: morning, your Honor. THE COURT: And I will take an appearance from the defendant. MR. STREETER: Jonathan Streeter, for Mr. Lavidas. THE COURT: And, Mr. Lavidas, you are participating, as well, in this proceeding? THE DEFENDANT: Yes, your Honor. THE COURT: Thank you. THE DEFENDANT: I can hear you well. THE COURT: This is a CourtCall proceeding. It is now 11:12. The situation is as follows: This proceeding was scheduled to begin at 11:00 o'clock. The defendant is incarcerated in the MDC. are conducting this proceeding virtually through a technology called CourtCall. The plan was for the defendant and defense counsel, who are separately located, to both be able to participate through videoconferencing procedure. Mr. Streeter, defense counsel, has audio access, but

it is -- to our great disappointment, he does not have video

access. I can see both the defendant and the Assistant United States Attorney, and they can see me.

Am I right, Mr. Lavidas, you can see me? Is that correct?

THE DEFENDANT: That's correct, your Honor.

THE COURT: And am I right, Mr. Tracer, that you can see me?

MR. TRACER: Yes, your Honor.

THE COURT: Thank you.

But, unfortunately, Mr. Streeter cannot see any of us, and we cannot see him. One of the capabilities that we had hoped to be available to the defendant and defense counsel in this conference call and sentencing proceeding is that they would be able to consult with each other separately if that became important for either of them during this sentencing proceeding.

Mr. Rogers, can I ask, even though defense counsel does not have video access to this proceeding, will he still, technologically, be able to have a private conversation with his client or not?

MR. ROGERS: Yes, Judge. I was just actually in a private room with him, and we were communicating without issue.

THE COURT: Thank you.

Mr. Rogers, from the District Executive's office, has been helping us with the technological challenges that we've

been faced with since 11:00 o'clock.

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Mr. Streeter, I apologize, on behalf of the Court and CourtCall, that the videoconferencing capability has not permitted you to see us or us to see you. When I say "us," I mean -- oh, ho, Mr. Streeter just --

MR. STREETER: My associate, Siobhan Namazi, sent me an email telling me how to fix the problem. So thank you to her.

THE COURT: Oh, wonderful.

So, let me begin again.

Mr. Lavidas, can you see your attorney now?

THE DEFENDANT: Yes, I can, your Honor.

THE COURT: And, Mr. Streeter, are you able to see your client?

MR. STREETER: I am, yes, your Honor. Thank you.

THE COURT: And are you able to see me, Mr. Streeter?

MR. STREETER: I am, yes, your Honor.

THE COURT: Okay, good.

So let's begin the sentencing proceeding. I'm going to ask, for the benefit of others who use CourtCall,

Mr. Streeter, if, when this proceeding is done, you could let my deputy, who will then send the information to Mr. Rogers, if you could let Ms. Rojas know what tips you got from your staff that solved the problem, so that Mr. Rogers can help others in this same way in future difficulty. Would you be able to do

that, Mr. Streeter?

MR. STREETER: I absolutely will, yes, your Honor.

THE COURT: Thank you so much.

Mr. Rogers has been able to work magic in a number of ways in these proceedings, but there are always new challenges.

Let me begin with further comments about the situation in which we find ourselves.

We are conducting the sentencing proceeding remotely. And under our district's rules, no one may broadcast or record this proceeding, and a violation of those rules will result in sanctions.

Notice of this sentencing proceeding has been filed on the public record, and both the press and the public have access to the audio of this proceeding, and counsel should assume that they are participating remotely and able to hear all that we have to say during the course of this proceeding.

I want to make findings with respect to the CARES Act as well. The chief judge of our district has entered a number of orders pursuant to the CARES Act making appropriate findings as to why it is not possible at this time for us to proceed in court in person with a proceeding of this importance, including a sentencing proceeding. Her most recent order of that kind was issued on June 24th of this year. She found that felony sentences cannot be conducted in person without seriously jeopardizing public health and safety due to our pandemic.

I am able to find that there are good reasons for not further delaying this sentencing proceeding and that a further delay in this sentencing proceeding would result in serious harm to the interests of justice, and I am able to make that finding because of a variety of things.

First of all, the defendant is seeking a sentence of time served here. It is possible that in July, we would be able to conduct in-person sentencing proceedings in the Southern District courthouse with the defendant present in the courtroom, and able to see me and me able to see him, and all counsel appearing, as well, in my courtroom, but the defendant has waived his right to that personal presence in my courtroom for a sentencing proceeding. He's waived it a number of times, as represented by his counsel, and, most recently, this week, when given the option of waiting a bit longer and seeing if we could conduct an in-person proceeding in July.

I have a written waiver from the defendant, I believe, and I think that was filed on June 18th.

I have recent letters from defense counsel, filed on ECF, indicating the defendant's strong desire to move forward with the sentencing today and not to wait to see if we could do it in person a few weeks from now or even next week.

So, with that sort of background, I want to confirm today, first with you, Mr. Streeter, and then with the defendant. Mr. Streeter, have I accurately described the

defendant's desire to proceed with his sentence today to a videoconference procedure and to give up his right to appear before me in person, in my courtroom, for a sentencing?

MR. STREETER: You have, your Honor.

THE COURT: And, Mr. Lavidas, let me ask you: Have you heard what I described on the record as to the options that you have for proceeding to sentence either today or at a later date, perhaps in my courtroom?

THE DEFENDANT: Yes, I did, your Honor.

THE COURT: And is it your desire to proceed with your sentence today even though it cannot occur in my courtroom with you and me present in the same room?

THE DEFENDANT: Yes, your Honor.

THE COURT: Okay.

I find a knowing and voluntary waiver of the right to be present for this sentencing proceeding and of the defendant's desire to, instead, proceed remotely to this videoconference facility.

Let me describe some other things that are sort of background to this sentencing proceeding.

I received a number of submissions in connection with this sentence. I have the defense submission of June 8th; I have the supplemental submission of June 9th; I have, as part of the sentencing submissions, 144 letters from family and friends of the defendant and fellow inmates of the defendant; I

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have two letters from psychologists regarding the mental health and impact of their separation from the defendant on the wife and daughter of the defendant, who live in New York; I have sentencing transcripts for defendants that the defendant wishes the Court to consider when arriving at what he suggests is an appropriate sentence for this individual defendant; I have the government's submission of June 16th; I have another defense submission of June 22nd, and I should mention, as well, that in connection with some comparators' sentences, or sentences of other defendants, the defendant, in particular, wants me to consider the sentence imposed on Bryan Cohen, an investment banker that pleaded guilty as part of the same overall or overarching insider trading scheme, not someone directly involved with the defendant at all. I don't want to imply that, but there's a large scheme here, and that was somewhat described at trial, and it's not in dispute that there was an overarching scheme.

I also received, on June 24th, a consent restitution order. The defendant is consenting to restitution in the amount of \$186,430.99. Pursuant to the terms of the restitution order, he is to make payment of half that amount within 90 days of entry of the order — that is, \$93,215.50 — and the requirement to pay the remainder is dependent on what happens with respect to the sentence of a coconspirator,

Mr. Demane, who testified at trial. The government represents

in the restitution order that it will seek the same amount of restitution to be paid to Takeda/Ariad from Mr. Demane at his sentence and will seek an order that he be required to pay that amount in 90 days.

Let me ask the government: When you make a reference to that amount, you mean the amount to be \$186,000, et cetera, roughly, Mr. Tracer?

MR. TRACER: I'm sorry, I'm not sure I understand the Court's question.

THE COURT: Thank you.

The restitution order that's been proposed here is for joint and several liability, as I understand it, for the amount -- and I'm rounding here -- of \$186,000. Do I understand that correctly?

MR. TRACER: Correct, your Honor.

THE COURT: And, therefore, you would be seeking an order within 90 days of Mr. Demane's sentence, that he pay that amount -- that is roughly 186,000 -- or that he pay half of that amount -- roughly 93,000 -- within 90 days of Mr. Demane's sentence?

MR. TRACER: That's right, your Honor.

THE COURT: What? What is right?

MR. TRACER: So, if Mr. Lavidas pays half of the restitution, in other words, if he complies with the agreement that we have to pay his half, then we will seek the remainder,

so the 93,000 or so from Mr. Demane within 90 days of his sentencing, such that the restitution would be split between the two of them.

THE COURT: So, counsel, I need your guidance with respect to the following situation: As I understand it, this proposed restitution order contemplates that this defendant, if I sign this order of restitution, that Mr. Lavidas will pay the entire amount of 186,000 subject to reduction, since it would be imposed jointly and severally on he and Mr. Demane, subject to reduction for any amount that Mr. Demane pays within 90 days of Mr. Demane's sentence. I want to ask counsel what their understanding is if Mr. Demane does not pay his half — that is roughly the 93,000 — within 90 days of Mr. Demane's sentence.

MR. TRACER: So, our expectation is that if
Mr. Demane, for whatever reason, does not or is not able to pay
that amount, then because the defendant is still on the hook
for the entire amount — in other words, the 186,000 — then
the defendant would be liable for that other half as well after
that time. But what this does is, effectively, it defers his
obligation to pay that in order to allow us to seek that from
Demane. But to your Honor's question, again, if Mr. Demane
were not to pay that, then Mr. Lavidas would be on the hook for
the entire amount.

THE COURT: Okay. Thank you.

So, one of the things I have to do in ordering

restitution is also to order a payment schedule for restitution of any remaining amount that remains due and owing from Mr. Lavidas.

Have counsel discussed what schedule -- for any remaining amount of restitution beyond the roughly \$92,000, what that payment schedule should be?

MR. TRACER: We have not had any discussions between counsel about that.

We'd be happy --

MR. STREETER: My understanding -- and we're agreeable to this -- is that Mr. Lavidas' 93,000 would be due within 90 days of his -- the order being entered in his case, and then the remaining 93,000 for him would be deferred until after 90 days after Mr. Demane's sentencing, and if Mr. Demane does not, or is not ordered to, pay the other 93,000, then Mr. Lavidas' would come due.

And maybe what your Honor can do is set a schedule for after 90 days. So maybe another 90 days after that, because I think if Mr. Demane doesn't pay, I certainly will be encouraging the government to try to make him pay, because the intent of this order is that they will split it, and if he doesn't pay within 90 days, I would like there to be some period of time for the government to pursue him for it before Mr. Lavidas is obligated to pay the other half.

But the intent of the order is -- I'm sorry, that's

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1 it. 2 THE COURT: Okay. 3 So, I will revise the restitution order, so that 4 should any amount remain outstanding after Mr. Demane's 5 sentence, then Mr. Lavidas will have 90 days thereafter to 6 complete payment of the restitution amount due and owing. 7 Is that agreeable to the government? 8 MR. TRACER: It is, your Honor. 9 THE COURT: Thank you. 10 Another open issue: Mr. Tracer, any need to issue a forfeiture order? 11 MR. TRACER: No, your Honor. We're not seeking any 12 13 forfeiture here. 14 THE COURT: Thank you. 15 So, I think we can now go into the substance of the issues presented to me for this sentence. Let me just talk 16

about the guidelines calculation for a moment.

The defendant was convicted at trial. The presentence report calculates his guidelines range as follows: An offense level of 26 and a criminal history category of I, with a sentencing range of 63 to 78 months.

Let me first ask defense counsel: Have you and your client both reviewed the presentence report?

MR. STREETER: We have, your Honor.

THE COURT: Do you have any objections to the

presentence report, other than what might be contained in your written sentencing submissions to me?

MR. STREETER: None other than what's in the written sentencing submissions.

THE COURT: Thank you, Mr. Streeter.

I should mention with respect to the presentence report, the presentence report is made part of the record in this case and shall be filed under seal. Counsel, should there be an appeal, counsel on appeal may have access to the sealed presentence report without further application to this Court.

The defendant seeks a role adjustment here and, therefore, a different calculation of the sentencing guidelines range. He seeks a role adjustment as a minimal participant in the criminal activity.

He also seeks, after application of Section 3553(a) factors, a sentence of time served. The defendant has been in custody since October 18th, 2019.

The probation department recommends a sentence of 18 months. It does not adopt the defendant's request for a role adjustment.

The government also opposes a role adjustment. Its sentencing submission suggests a sentence substantially below the bottom of the guidelines range; that is, 63 months, but also a sentence substantially in excess of the 18 months recommended by the probation department.

So, I think that is the structure of the issues before me. I want to hear counsel, obviously, on the issue of role adjustment, if you wish to say anything to supplement your written submissions to me. But, also, I need to give counsel an opportunity to address anything they'd like to say to me in connection with this sentence and, in particular, how I should apply the 3553(a) factors. And, of course, I need to hear from the defendant.

Because the role adjustment issue is so intimately tied to the facts underlying the criminal conduct here for which the defendant was convicted, I think it would be better, unless counsel wish to proceed otherwise, that we bind any additional arguments they want to make about role adjustment with their general statements with respect to what the appropriate sentence is in this case.

Is that agreeable to you, Mr. Streeter?

MR. STREETER: It is, your Honor.

THE COURT: Is that agreeable to you, Mr. Tracer?

MR. TRACER: Yes, your Honor.

THE COURT: Okay.

With that understanding, I'm going to begin by just putting on the record -- well, no, I know counsel are familiar with the sentencing guidelines for role adjustment, 3B1.2. I'm not going to put that on the record -- I may later -- but I'll hear anything the government has to say, either about the role

adjustment or about the sentence that I should impose today, for any reason that it believes is important for me to consider.

MR. TRACER: Thank you, your Honor. This is Daniel Tracer.

I'd like to address the role adjustment, and then I will move from that into the larger 3553 discussion that we want to amplify a little bit from our submission.

With respect to the role adjustment: I think that the fundamental flaw in the defendant's argument here is that he wants to have it both ways. He wants to say that his client was not involved in a larger conspiracy; in other words, all these downstream tippees, he was not involved in that, but, at the same time, for purposes of minor-role adjustment, he wants to say, well, he didn't know about all these other things. So I think you can't have it both ways.

Here, your Honor, the crime that was proven at trial was really just a fairly narrow set of criminal conduct. It is the illegal tipping that comes from his father, he gets that information, he gives it to Mr. Nikas, Mr. Nikas shares it with Demane. Now, other things happen, as your Honor alluded to earlier, there's a lot more going on, but that's not the crime that the defendant is charged with, and the crime that he is charged with, he cannot be considered a minor role within that crime. And, again, specifically, the crime of tipping Ariad

MNPI from his father to Mr. Nikas.

For example, the factors that we both address in our submission talk with the degree to which the defendant understood the scope of the criminal activity. Mr. Lavidas understood, when he was giving that information to Nikas, that Nikas was going to trade on it. That's the crime alleged, and he understood the scope of that crime.

With respect to the defendant's planning and organizing of the activity and the defendant's decision-making in that activity, it was the defendant's decision to share that information with Nikas. So he was -- not just was he not minimal, he was central to the charged scheme in this case, the illegal tipping on Ariad.

And defense counsel makes note of the fact that he being essential is not -- does not necessarily negate the minor role. And I think, your Honor, if you look at how that's described and how it's used, our understanding of that is, you know, you might have a drug conspiracy with someone who is selling drugs on the corner, and that person is kind of a very small level concern, and you might say, well, he's essential because if he doesn't sell the drugs, the crime never happens. And I think it's that kind of case that the guidelines is getting at in saying the fact that someone is essential doesn't necessarily preclude a minor role.

This case is very different. In this case, the

defendant had a unique position of access to confidential information, he understood that that information was confidential, he understood that that information was very valuable, and he decided to use that information in order to enrich his friend. So, for those reasons, and as further explained in our submission, we don't think that within the charged crime and the proven claim in this case, the defendant played a minor role in that particular crime.

Turning to the 3553 factors more generally: As your Honor stated, our view here — and we've thought about it very carefully — is that the guideline range is probably a little too high in this case, and so we are not asking for a guideline sentence, but we do think a substantial term of incarceration is necessary in terms of general deterrence and promoting respect for the law for this serious crime, and we think that the probation office's recommendation is a little bit low, and the sentence really should be in excess of that to reflect the severity of the crime and to make a proper set of deterrence out of this case.

Reading through the defendant's submission, the defendant talks a lot about the value of hard work in his life, and without detracting from other areas of his life where he may have worked hard, this case and what was proven at trial shows a different side of his character, where the facts proven at trial show that he was willing to take a shortcut when he

had information that was valuable and give it to his friend.

While the defendant says that he was not doing it for pecuniary gain and he didn't make money out of it, I think that's a little overly simplistic in this case. This was a crime of greed and arrogance. It was a crime of greed in the sense that having confidential information and giving it to someone else is the same thing as stealing from a company and giving it to your friend. It bestows a pecuniary value on his friend, and the fact that he chose not to take that money himself, but to give it to his friend, because his friend was someone he had a particularly valuable business relationship with, does not take it out of the scope of a crime of greed in any way.

And it was a crime of arrogance. He did not think he would get caught, he thought he had this position of privilege, and he could freely give away this information to his chosen few, and they could make money from it, and that's how this crime worked, and it was a serious crime.

The defendant suggests that he was taken advantage of a few times in his brief, that Nikas somehow hoodwinked him into doing this. And I don't think, your Honor, that that is consistent with the picture that the defendant paints of himself, a hard-working sophisticated businessman. I think, your Honor, the far more reasonable inference to draw is that he knew what he was doing, understood what he was doing, and

believed that this was a good way for him to cheat, and get ahead, and advance him and his friend's business interests.

The fact that the defendant also talks about he didn't personally trade or he didn't understand how shorting worked, at the end of the day, I don't think there's any dispute here that the defendant understood that Nikas was a very wealthy person, it was well-known that Nikas was a securities trader, and it was no secret why Mr. Nikas wanted this information. Again, the evidence shows that these tips happened multiple times, so he continued to give it to Mr. Nikas and had the continued understanding that this was valuable to Mr. Nikas. So, the idea that somehow he didn't really understand what was going to happen or he really didn't know how things worked once he gave the information, again, I think it paints the defendant as more naive than he really is and, again, downplays his role as a middleman, which he really was in this scheme.

In terms of other cases, briefly, your Honor, we did cite the Stewart case to your Honor. I think that is a case that bears a lot of similarity. Stewart was an insider who tipped to his father. Kind of like here, he tipped to someone he had a close personal friendship with. It was not an exchange for bags of cash or anything like that, he did it on multiple occasions, and, in that case, Stewart originally got a 36-month sentence, and it was subsequently reduced to a 24-month sentence, but we think that kind of tipping and that

kind of case is actually far more comparable to the instant case than some of the others that the defendant cited that involved people who were far less sophisticated or who didn't quite have that level of friendship that they were tipping.

I want to address, briefly, the Cohen sentence that your Honor alluded to, which was the subject of the defendant's supplemental letter to the Court. Just three points about the Cohen sentence, and, for context, your Honor is right, Cohen is a participant in the broader insider trading scheme that this investigation arises out of, but he had no — there is no alleged allegation between Mr. Lavidas and Mr. Cohen.

Mr. Cohen got a sentence of home confinement. In that case, however, I want to point out three things that I think make Mr. Cohen's case different than this case:

Number one -- and this was something that Mr. Cohen relied very heavily on -- is that Mr. Cohen agreed to accept responsibility and pleaded guilty quite quickly after being charged;

Number two, the guidelines in that case were far lower than this case. The actual actionable -- in other words, U.S. trading, U.S. stock trading, that happened in that case was around \$260,000, and, so, versus Nikas, who made \$6.5 million in this case, which is a far, far greater amount at issue;

And, number three, Mr. Cohen had a substantial submission -- and this came up at his sentencing -- of certain

medical conditions that created a real health risk if he were to be put in prison, and Judge Pauley, I think, took that into account substantially as well in imposing sentence.

So, the Cohen case, I think, for those three reasons, really doesn't provide good instruction in this case, and, instead, as we've outlined in our papers, we think this is a case where a substantial term of imprisonment, albeit not necessarily the guidelines, but a meaningful and substantial term of imprisonment is appropriate. And I'm happy to answer any additional questions, if the Court has them.

THE COURT: I want to give you a chance to address this, Mr. Tracer, because I want, also, Mr. Streeter to have a chance to address it: The jury found, in returning its verdict, that the defendant's father, who was on the board of Ariad and a close friend of the CEO of Ariad, Mr. Berger, that the jury found that the defendant's father knowingly violated his fiduciary duty to Ariad by tipping his son; that the defendant's father anticipated that securities trading would occur; and that the defendant's father anticipated receiving a personal benefit from the tipping.

The jury also found, by returning its verdict of guilty, that the defendant himself knew that his father had breached his fiduciary duty to Ariad when his father tipped him; that the defendant anticipated that his father would receive a personal benefit from the tipping; and that the

defendant also personally benefited, either directly or indirectly, by the tipping that he did of Mr. Nikas. So, I think the evidence at trial painted a picture that the jury apparently found credible of a wealthy Greek businessman, the defendant's father, having liquidity problems during the very time that the defendant was engaged in this tipping activity of Mr. Nikas, and Greece was — though I don't think this was described in great detail to the jury, it wasn't disputed that Greece was going through a period of great financial difficulty at the time and that the defendant's father was as well.

So, I think the jury found, based on the charge and the guilty verdict, that the defendant was knowingly engaged in a tipping scheme with his father, his father knowingly breaching his duty to Ariad, in the hope that the family would benefit from tipping Mr. Nikas. I want to make sure that I understood correctly what the government's theory was and what the government believed the evidence at trial supported and what the jury found.

MR. TRACER: Sure, your Honor.

Let me go through what our understanding, and I think the fair and reasonable inferences — and this is Daniel

Tracer — what the fair and reasonable inferences are from the evidence presented at trial.

Your Honor is right, there was evidence at trial that the defendant's family had substantial wealth, but that they

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did have liquidity problems, and there was also evidence at trial that the defendant himself was building this snack business and was also looking for investors, and investments, and sources of liquidity. So, both the family and the son, during the relevant period, were looking for liquidity and were looking for opportunities for business advancement.

With respect to the -- and what Mr. Demane, I believe, testified is that Mr. Nikas told him that he was having meetings with the father and the son; in other words, Mr. Nikas was very, very friendly with Mr. Lavidas, but was also friendly with Mr. Lavidas' father and met with him from time to time. And during those meetings, undoubtedly, they discussed Mr. Nikas' business, and, ultimately, that led to the tipping through the father, to the son, to Mr. Nikas. So what I think the evidence shows that the father was doing, by providing this information to his son, was he was able to help his son without reaching into his own pocket. In other words, he knew that his son -- he didn't have the liquidity to provide money to his son, he knew that his son was building this business, and by tipping confidential information to his son that his son could give to Nikas, he was able to benefit his son without having to draw on his own bank account.

And the defendant, in turn, took that information and gave it to Nikas as a way of developing the friendship with Nikas, and that friendship was not just a friendship to

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hangout, that was a friendship that involved substantive business transactions. So the evidence at trial, for example, showed that Nikas made a loan to the defendant's company, that his wife made an investment in the defendant's company, and those were the sort of pecuniary benefits that the defendant got from Mr. Nikas. There was also testimony, I think from Mr. Giatrakos, that Mr. Nikas may have been involved in helping Mr. Lavidas with the snack bar business; in other words, like where to put the bars in different drugstores and things like So, at the end of the day, Mr. Lavidas was cultivating this friendship and relationship with Mr. Nikas in order to advance his business interests. That was the nature of the quid pro quo here. And the father, by supplying the information, was essentially giving fuel to his son. able to financially benefit his son and ensure his son's success through taking that confidential information that was entrusted to him and giving it to his son.

That's the government's theory, and I think, for the reasons I described, the evidence at trial, one can infer all of those things very reasonably.

THE COURT: Okay. Thank you.

Mr. Streeter, I want to turn to you. Obviously, I know you want to address the role issue, but I'll also hear anything you have to say with respect to what sentence I should impose here.

MR. STREETER: Thank you, your Honor.

I'm going to address the role issue and the other issues that have come up here today in the course of my broader discussion about what the appropriate sentence is in this case.

So, first off, I wanted to start off talking about Mr. Lavidas as a person.

Mr. Lavidas has spent his entire life helping his broader community. He has engaged in many, many acts of public charity, serving in many charities, volunteering and helping. They are listed extensively in the presentence report and in our sentencing submission.

He has also spent an enormous amount of time in his life helping the people around him, his coworkers, the employees of his family business, his friends, his family members.

He has 144 letters of support that were submitted in connection with this sentencing by coworkers, classmates, teachers, employees, friends, business associates, inmates at the MDC, members of his broader community. At this time of public shame, 144 people came forward and wrote letters to your Honor, which have been publicly filed, put their names on those letters for the public file, and said this is a good man who has done an enormous amount of good in his life. He's only 39 years old, and to already have this many people saying this many things about his public charity, his personal charity, his

giving nature, the manner in which he helps his fellow inmates at the MDC, which your Honor mentioned before in listing the submissions, he is incredibly good to his community and to the people --

THE COURT: Excuse me, Mr. Streeter. I think some of the inmate letters were from the MCC inmates, I think.

MR. STREETER: That's correct, your Honor.

THE COURT: Thank you.

MR. STREETER: Shortly after he got to the MDC, he was put on lockdown, and it became impossible, and that's when the sentencing was scheduled to occur much earlier, but, yes, your Honor, thank you.

So, look, we have a record of, really, an extraordinary amount of good service to the people in his life and to the broader community at a very young age of 39, and I think 144 letters is an extraordinary testament to that, and that must be taken account of at the time of the sentencing.

The second thing I want to say is that, even according to the government's most strident representation of its evidence, this case is about highly, highly aberrant conduct. If you accept everything that the government has alleged, it is about three tips provided, two of them seven years ago, one of them five years ago, to help a friend. There is no allegation that he got a cut of the profits. We had a discussion just now about some of the

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financial aspects of the case, and I want to talk about that for a minute, but putting that aside, this is about three tips, five and seven years ago, to one friend, to help that friend. That is not a lifetime of crime or anything like it. It is, even accepting the government's evidence completely as true, highly, highly aberrant conduct.

Now, in terms of the financial evidence, your Honor:

First of all, I want to say this: You said some things about the jury's verdict. All that the jury needed to conclude, as your instructions said, as a matter of law here, was that Mr. Lavidas and his father expected to benefit a friend, Mr. Nikas. That's all that was required. That's all they needed to find, was that they were friends and that they expected for Mr. Nikas to get a benefit as a friend from them, the manner in which it makes them feel good by helping a That is all the instructions required. That's all that is required by the law. And we cannot surmise that the jury concluded anything more than that from tendrils of evidence about potential financial benefits even the government did not aggressively pursue at this trial. The government argued in its opening and in its closing that the principal motivation and the benefit that Mr. Lavidas got here was helping a friend.

Now, I know there was some other evidence, and I want to talk about that for a minute, but even the government did

not focus on that evidence. Even the government, to its credit, did not allege that there were cash payments, because there were none, and there was no evidence of any. It was an assumption by Mr. Demane in his prep there were cash payments, and he testified at trial that that was an assumption that he made, but there was no basis for it, other than that he was making cash payments to his sources.

Now, in terms of the financial benefits alleged here, it is essentially an investment by Mr. Nikas' wife, who is independently wealthy, in the health food bar company. That investment was made not close in time to the tips; it was made well after the tips. It was fully documented and public. She got shares in exchange for it, and she had an interest in sort of the health food business, as was testified to at trial. And so the connection between the two was not made, and the government, to its credit, didn't argue it in closing. They were friends, they had overlapping business interests, but it did not say that one was a quid pro quo for the other in its closing or its opening.

The second thing I wanted to say about the loan, the loan that Mr. Nikas made, well after the tips alleged in this case, number one, was not in any way explicitly tied to these tips; and, secondly, one-half of that loan was paid back before Mr. Lavidas was arrested. It does not make sense that if he was being paid for the tips, if you pay back one-half of the

loan, and he would have paid back the other half of the loan if he hadn't been arrested in this case.

And, so, the connection between the financial issues and the benefit in this case was not strong, and the government didn't argue it. All they needed to prove was that both Mr. Lavidas and his father expected to help a friend. That's all the jury had to find, and that is what the evidence is.

Now, even accepting all of that, even accepting that it's something more than that, there were no cash payments, there was no such thing, and even according to the government, Mr. Lavidas is much, much less culpable than the other players in this scheme.

And I want to focus now on the role for a minute.

The relevant people to consider for a role reduction are Mr. Nikas, Mr. Demane, who the government alleged was a coconspirator, and Mr. Lavidas. And I don't think, your Honor, there's any way to look at this evidence that the conduct that Mr. Demane and Mr. Nikas engaged in, even with respect to the trading they did on Ariad, the burner phones, all of this activity that they engaged in, there is no way to look at this evidence, even if you just confine it to the Ariad scheme, and not say that Mr. Lavidas was much, much less culpable than those two other people. Those two other people made about \$7-1/2 million in profits. Mr. Lavidas had no way of knowing, or controlling, or having any input into those profits. He

participated in none of the trading, he got none of the proceeds from it, he had no way of knowing what they would do.

Assuming everything about the verdict is true, that he did know that Mr. Nikas would trade, there is no evidence that he had any idea how much or what he would trade. And the burner phones and all the other deceptive conduct was certainly part of the Ariad scheme, and so even just confining ourselves to the individuals that the government says need to be compared for purposes of culpability in evaluating a minor role, Mr. Lavidas is clearly much, much less culpable than those two other individuals.

The other thing to consider, your Honor, is that what Mr. Tracer just said about his conduct that makes him not eligible for a role reduction, what Mr. Tracer listed for your Honor were the minimal requirements to find guilt that Mr. Lavidas knew that Mr. Nikas would trade. If they hadn't proven that, he would not have been found guilty. And the other things that Mr. Tracer said were minimal requirements, that there was a benefit that Mr. Nikas got, that there was a breach of a duty at the company level by the father that then resulted in the son being the middleman. These are all things that the government needed to prove minimally in order to meet the elements of the crime. It cannot be the law that if you meet the elements of the crime, you are not eligible for a minor-role reduction. That would mean no one would ever be

eligible for a minor-role reduction. The reality is that the evidence here, even by the government's rendering, was about minimal requirements for the elements of the crime. And so a minor-role reduction is appropriate here.

Now, I don't want to allow this proceeding to get sort of taken over by that issue. I think the real issue here, your Honor, is what is a fair and just sentence in this case. What is the right sentence, in this case, in light of the sentences that have been given to other people in this case, the sentences that have been given to other people who engaged in similar conduct, and the extraordinary circumstances under which Mr. Lavidas has already served eight and a half months in prison, and his otherwise extraordinary circumstances as a very, very good man who has been an incredibly charitable member of his community, as testified to by the 144 letters.

And I want to talk a little bit about some of that.

I want to talk for a minute about -- I mean, we talked already about how Mr. Lavidas was much less culpable than the other players in this scheme, even Mr. Demane and Mr. Nikas, who the government acknowledges are part of the Ariad scheme. Now, parenthetically, he's also much, much less culpable than the other people in this case, who your Honor heard about:

John Dodelande, who received \$12 million in cash, Yomi Rodrig, and other players that we heard about at the trial, and, certainly, Mr. Demane, who is a career criminal, you heard tens

of millions of dollars here, so there's no doubt about that.

But moving to comparing Mr. Lavidas to other people who have been convicted of similar crimes: 18, U.S.C., 3553(a) directs the Court to consider that. And when you compare Mr. Lavidas to the sentences that have been given to other people like him, even the government acknowledges that there have been many, many such sentences that have been below the eight and a half months we're asking for here, that have been probationary sentences or lower than the eight and a half months, or perhaps slightly higher than the sentence here. But I'm going to explain to your Honor why I think the eight and a half months is the right sentence here even if another defendant got 12 months in other circumstances that were served under very, very different circumstances from the circumstances Mr. Lavidas has already served under.

We showed this in our sentencing submission. There are 12 pages or so in the sentencing submission that go through in detail of a series of other sentences. We canvassed every single sentencing that has occurred in the Southern District in an insider trading case in the last ten years, and we tried to represent to your Honor a representative sample. The government came back with one sentence, the Sean Stewart sentence, and I'm going to talk about this as I go through this, but, first of all, I want to give you some examples from what we submitted.

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For one, there is the Benjamin Chow sentencing. Benjamin Chow is very similar to Mr. Lavidas. He worked at a private equity fund. He is alleged, and he was convicted at trial -- not a plea -- convicted at trial of tipping a friend. That friend made \$5 million in profits on the tips. Mr. Chow had no knowledge or control over how much trading he would do, just as Mr. Lavidas had no knowledge or control over how much trading Nikas, or Demane, or anybody else would do here. Mr. Chow was convicted at trial. He had the exact same sentencing quidelines range that the government alleges here. And Judge Woods decided that the guidelines grossly overstated his culpability because of the fact that he had no control over the trading. If there had been \$10,000 worth of trading, he'd have a totally different guidelines range than the 5 million in trading that Benjamin Chow's tippee engaged in. And Judge Woods decided, in addition to the family circumstances and his otherwise good life, like Mr. Lavidas, that the appropriate sentence was three months in custody after a trial. That is significantly lower than the sentence here. And, incidentally, Judge, that sentence was served at a camp, self-surrender, months after his sentencing. Very, very different circumstances than ours here.

The next sentence I wanted to mention to you in thinking about other similarly situated defendants -- and, incidentally, I will say, also, Mr. Chow lied to FINRA when he

was questioned about the conduct here in his case. Mr. Lavidas never, ever lied to anybody about any of this. He went to trial -- he did -- but he did not lie to anybody about any of this. And that is a difference between him and both Mr. Chow that makes him less culpable, and I will get to Mr. Stewart in a minute.

Cameron Collins: Cameron Collins was the son of a sitting U.S. House of Representatives member who was also a member of the board of a pharmaceutical company. His father was that member of Congress. He was tipped by his father about some information about that company, and he himself tipped his friends about it, and he himself traded, avoiding losses of \$571,000. So, unlike Mr. Lavidas, who never, ever traded, Mr. Collins traded on the information he was tipped to the tune of \$571,000, tipped others, and he also lied to the FBI when he was asked about the conduct.

The defense in that case asked for a probationary sentence based on his lifetime of good works, the fact that this was aberrant conduct, and that the guidelines overstated his culpability. And Judge Broderick agreed and gave him a sentence of probation.

Now, I know in that case, he pled guilty, but, number one, his conduct was in many ways much more culpable, he lied, he traded himself; and, secondly, he got probation, and Mr. Lavidas has already served eight and a half months of very

hard time, as I'll discuss in a minute.

The last one I want to discuss with you is Bryan Cohen. The government raised it. I want to talk about that case for a minute.

Mr. Cohen tipped Demane, who then tipped Nikas. The government says the guidelines were much lower in that case.

The guidelines in that case were only much lower because of the accident of where his tippees traded. They traded in Europe, and, therefore, that didn't count for purposes of the sentencing guidelines, and so his guidelines were only 200 -- can you hear me still?

THE COURT: Yes.

MR. STREETER: His guidelines were only based on \$260,000 in trading, but as the government laid out in its sentencing submission in the Cohen case, in fact, Mr. Demane and Mr. Nikas made more money off of Cohen's tips than they did off of Mr. Lavidas' tips. They made about \$9 million off of Mr. Cohen's tips, and the government, in that sentencing submission, said that that was relevant for considering sentencing. Now the government wants you only to consider the fact that the guidelines sentence, which is determined only by the accident of geographically where the trading occurred, should be the difference maker. The reality is that Bryan Cohen's tips actually resulted in more profits for Demane and Nikas than Mr. Lavidas' did.

Secondly, Mr. Cohen's conduct was much, much more culpable. He received more than a million dollars in cash payments in bags in Europe, which he hid in safes at his parents' house. This is in the government's sentencing submission. He used burner phones. He engaged in coded conversations. The person who handed out the burner phones testified in this case and testified that Mr. Lavidas didn't get burner phones. Mr. Lavidas was much, much less culpable than Bryan Cohen.

And, so, the Bryan Cohen case, where Judge Pauley sentenced him to home confinement, is an important guide here, and, frankly, Mr. Lavidas is much, much less culpable than Mr. Cohen.

I want to talk for a minute about the Sean Stewart case. Now, the Sean Stewart case: Number one, Mr. Stewart's sentence was 24 months. He had been released from BOP custody five months before finishing serving his sentence. He is now out on home confinement. He got out five months early.

And, incidentally, I want to say something about what the government said about Cohen and his medical condition.

Mr. Cohen is a 34-year-old person who has asthma. Now, I'm not going to minimize that, but we're not talking about an aged person who has COPD or something where COVID-19 is a much more serious threat. The reality is that Judge Pauley looked at all this picture that I just told you, and he decided that the

appropriate sentence was a period of home confinement.

With respect to Mr. Stewart: Mr. Stewart had a 24-month sentence, the longest sentence the government found to cite, and he was let out five months early as a consequence of COVID-19. He is a middle thirties healthy person. In addition, there were many, many factors in that case that made his conduct much, much more culpable than Mr. Lavidas is. Number one, he lied to his employer when they came around and asked about him tipping his father;

Number two, he lied to FINRA when they came around and asked about his tipping his father;

Number three, he coached his father to lie to the SEC when his testimony was taken;

Number four, he violated the terms of his bail and engaged in basically liquidating assets he wasn't supposed to liquidate while he was out on bail;

Number five, he testified and perjured himself at his trial.

All of those factors were highly relevant to the government's position on his sentencing, made him much more culpable, and were highly relevant to the two judges who sentenced him to, ultimately, 24 months' imprisonment.

Incidentally, Mr. Stewart, like Mr. Chow, self-surrendered months after his sentence to camp, and when COVID-19 came around, Mr. Stewart was released.

I want to now move briefly to the conditions of Mr. Lavidas' confinement. This is highly relevant to sentencing.

The time he has served has been very, very hard time. It has been at the MCC and then the MDC, and for the last 90 days, it has been almost entirely on lockdown. I want to give your Honor an example of what that means. The last week, as your Honor knows, our sentencing was canceled last Thursday because there was an issue at the MDC. The issue was that they got information that there was a weapon inside the facility, and they locked the entire facility down to search for the weapon. Mr. Lavidas has been, and was, locked down from Thursday morning, before the sentencing last week, up until yesterday. He was in his cell. Mr. Lavidas —

THE COURT: Okay. I lost a visual of the defendant at this very moment.

Mr. Rogers, are you still with us?

Ms. Rojas, could you please get Mr. Rogers to assist us?

THE DEPUTY CLERK: I will do so.

(Pause)

THE COURT: I should put on the record that it's now 12:18, and we probably lost the defendant's participation at about 12:15, roughly. And I have a message from Ms. Rojas that she has been in contact with Mr. Rogers from our District

1	Executive's office, who will, hopefully, be able to help us
2	regain the defendant's participation.
3	(Pause)
4	THE COURT: Thank you.
5	The court reporter has rejoined the proceeding.
6	Nothing has happened in his absence.
7	(Pause)
8	THE DEPUTY CLERK: Hello. This is Gloria Rojas
9	speaking.
10	THE COURT: Yes. My courtroom deputy is now speaking.
11	THE DEPUTY CLERK: Thank you, Judge Cote.
12	So, he should be reconnected soon, very soon. Matt
13	Rogers will stay on until just to make sure that it does
14	happen. So it should come up shortly.
15	THE COURT: Thank you.
16	We received that message at 12:22.
17	(Pause)
18	THE DEFENDANT: Hello.
19	THE COURT: It is now 12:25. I can see Mr. Lavidas.
20	Mr. Lavidas, can you see and hear me?
21	THE DEFENDANT: Yes, I can, your Honor.
22	THE COURT: Mr. Streeter, can you see and hear your
23	client?
24	MR. STREETER: I can, your Honor.
25	THE COURT: So, Mr. Lavidas, can you see and hear your

attorney?

THE DEFENDANT: Yes, I can, your Honor.

THE COURT: Thank you.

Mr. Streeter, you may continue.

MR. STREETER: Thank you, your Honor. I don't have much more to do.

I just want to spend a little bit of time on the conditions of confinement, and then I'll get to my last two points and wrap up.

For the last six days, Mr. Lavidas has been on lockdown. He has been allowed out of his cell for five minutes on two of those days to take a shower. This is no criticism of BOP, they were dealing with a crisis situation, but, your Honor, they were literally fed bread, and peanut butter, and granola bars for those six days. This is really hard circumstances for anybody to serve time in, your Honor, and it is relevant in thinking about the sentencing. He had no contact with his wife, with his daughter, with me, or anybody else.

And these basic conditions of confinement, this lockdown circumstance, has been on and off for 70 of the last 90 days, first because of COVID-19 for 52 days, then because of the George Floyd circumstances for another ten or so days, and then for the last six days because of this situation at the MDC that caused the sentencing to be delayed. So, 70 of the last

90 days, roughly 70 of the last 90 days, he has been under lockdown circumstances, essentially solitary confinement, coming out of his cell for 15 minutes a day, three days a week, those kinds of things. It has been very, very hard. And even when those circumstances are lifted, he's out of his cell for three hours a day on weekdays and back into his cell fully on weekends. He's been permitted no family visits for the last four months, and he's not seen his wife, he has not seen his daughter, who he's very close to, he's not seen his son, who was born one month ago. He has not had any visitation.

Now, I understand the government's approach, it's everybody is enduring this. And I also understand the BOP is doing the best it can under the circumstances, and I do not criticize that at all, but the facts are that Mr. Lavidas has endured eight and a half months of very, very hard time, and Judges McMahon, Rakoff, and Pauley have all decided, in other cases recently in this district, that the conditions of confinement and the harshness of those conditions is highly relevant in fashioning a sentence, and in all three of those cases where they considered it, they actually gave probationary sentences or noncustodial sentences. In the case of Judge Pauley, it was Mr. Cohen, and it was home confinement.

The other thing is that none of the other defendants that we discussed in our memo, the other people who we detail in those pages about other insider trading defendants, endured

these kinds of conditions. And so some of those people might have gotten a year and a day or something like that, but they got it by serving in a camp, self-surrendering, and that's part of why we're asking for time served here, your Honor, because eight and a half months has been a very, very stern punishment of eight and a half months.

I want to march now, your Honor, to the probation report, if I could, and address that briefly.

We're grateful for the probation report, we're grateful that they recommended a sentence well below the guidelines, but the probation report didn't take account of everything that I think your Honor should take account of, mostly because they couldn't have because some of the events occurred after they issued their report. Number one, I don't know what finding your Honor is going to make with respect to the role, but if your Honor does decide that some sort of role reduction is appropriate here, probation did not, and if you do decide a role reduction is appropriate, I think that changes the starting place, which oftentimes changes the ending place. So that's one thing that is relevant.

The next thing is that the probation report was issued on April 6th. That was just at the very beginning of these 70 days of lockdown that I just described to you. They had no way of knowing the sort of length, and extent, and sort of difficulty of the conditions of that lockdown, and so they

could not have taken account of it in making their recommendation. And they didn't take account of it, obviously, because it occurred after they issued their report.

Secondly, your Honor, the probation report doesn't discuss any of the other sentences that we discuss in our memorandum in which similarly situated defendants received significantly less than 18 months for similar, and oftentimes, more culpable conduct.

In addition, your Honor, the probation report was issued well before the Cohen sentencing. As we discussed, Cohen was sentenced to home confinement for conduct that was much more culpable. Probation couldn't have taken account of that because it happened well after they issued their recommendation.

The last thing I'll mention that probation didn't take account of -- again, because it occurred after the report -- is that since April 6th, the Bureau of Prisons has released many nonviolent first-time offenders, like Mr. Stewart, and that has to be relevant in thinking about how similarly situated defendants are being punished in these cases. And probation did not have access to that information because it had not yet happened. The Attorney General's memo authorizing the release of people didn't occur until early April, and that's when the report was issued, the probation report.

And, so, while we're grateful for the probation

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report's analysis of some of the issues, probation did not have access to or information about these other things because they just simply hadn't yet occurred.

The last thing I want to talk about is the impact of Mr. Lavidas' custody on his family. Judge, Judge Kaplan recently decided that this was highly relevant in sentencing an insider trading defendant. Other judges in this district, it is a well-known basis finding that when the guidelines are mandatory, for a downward departure from the guidelines, and this, Mr. Lavidas' continual incarceration, has already had a great impact on his family, and if it is continued on from today, it will continue to have a profound and troubling impact on his family. Your Honor mentioned at the outset that there are two letters in the exhibits that were issued back in March, prior to the last three months, about the impact of the incarceration on his wife and the impact of the incarceration on his daughter, and now his son has been born in the last month, and it will also has an impact on him. There can be no doubt from the 144 letters that Mr. Lavidas is a loving and doting father. He bathed his daughter regularly. He spent time with her all the time. He was absolutely devoted to her. And his absence is going to have a profound impact on her if it is extended.

Secondly, he is a devoted and caring husband. The letters demonstrate this in so many ways, I can't count them.

And he obviously will be a devoted father to his son, who was born while he was in custody, his wife gave birth to a month ago. His wife and two children are living in New York without any family support at all. Her family is from Italy, his family is from Greece, and none of them can travel here because of COVID-19. And so, Katerina Lavidas, his wife, is giving birth and dealing with raising their two children in their apartment in New York without any family support at all. She cannot visit her husband; her children cannot visit her husband. It seems obvious, given what's happening with COVID-19 exploding in many parts of the country, that visitations at BOP facilities are not going to be resumed anytime soon. They barely get to speak to him on the phone, especially during these lockdown periods.

THE COURT: I had a question about that last issue. I know at one time, the defendant's sisters were in New York, and he had childcare or support in the home that was employed. Can you address that?

MR. STREETER: Sure, your Honor. Absolutely.

So, he obviously has a father, a mother, and four siblings. The father and mother are in Greece. Three of his -- I'm sorry, three siblings. There are four children in the family. He has three siblings. Two of those siblings, his elder sister and one of his twin sisters, are in Greece, one of his sisters is in New York, but Katerina cannot have visitors

at the apartment given COVID-19. She's been pregnant for almost the entire time of his custody. People who are pregnant are highly at risk for COVID-19, and so she hasn't been able to even have friends over. So it is true that one of his sisters of his larger family is here in New York, but the reality is that there's not much family support there.

And it is true, your Honor, that they have had the assistance of a nanny inside the home, that is true, but there is no family support whatsoever. They are an ocean away.

Katerina is from Italy, she's not from New York, so she is alone in New York with a nanny raising two children now, without Mr. Lavidas, who's very close to them. And releasing him to be with his family and help take care of them would alleviate that concern and that problem, and it is a relevant factor in thinking about the sentence here.

The last thing I want to say, your Honor, is that over the last eight months, I have gotten to know Mr. Lavidas and his wife very well. These are incredibly kind, respectful, understated, generous, good people. I ask your Honor to impose a sentence of time served and return him to his family.

Thank you, your Honor.

THE COURT: Thank you.

Mr. Lavidas, is there anything you would like to say to me on your behalf in connection with this sentence?

THE DEFENDANT: I do.

Your Honor, thank you for giving me the opportunity to say a few words before you pronounce your sentence.

When I was a young boy, I remember hearing something that my grandfather used to say. He said that everyone expression has an imaginary label on his or her back where people can write what they think about us, but that label is visible to everyone else but the person who wears it. That idea has struck me from a young age, and I have tried throughout my life to work as hard as possible to fill my label with as many good words as possible.

When I read the letters that people submitted in support of my sentencing, so many events came to mind, so many memories surfaced, that warmed my heart. People have noticed my love and acts of kindness. When I read these letters, I cried.

As I read them, I also thought of the mistakes I have made in my life. Every time I did a mistake, I worked very hard to reflect upon it, to make sure I never repeat it. The last eight, almost nine months since my arrest have been the most difficult of my life not because I missed the comforts of life, no; it's because I miss, now appreciate, so much more — what God has given us all for free — the people we love, the beauty of nature, and the fulfillment we get when we help others.

But, most of all, I miss my special wife, Katerina,

and my precious daughter. We were very close. I used to bathe her, I used to feed her, and always make her a priority. My son has been born, but I still haven't met him. I'm not there to take care of my family, and I have not been there to support them and protect them throughout this pandemic.

I'm so sorry to my wife, who had to endure such a difficult pregnancy all by herself, with her family far away in Italy and my family far away in Greece. I'm so sorry to anyone else in my life who has supported me and helped me.

Your Honor, in the last months, I have learned the meaning of consequences and humility. The verdict in this case will be my personal burden for the rest of my life. My wife keeps me going, still standing on my feet, in the hope that as soon as my sentence will be over, I have the opportunity to vindicate myself by doing good, by being respectful, and helping people in any way I can. I know, your Honor, that I can't control what people will write of this imaginary label that I mentioned for my back, but what I know is that I will spend the rest of my life giving people reasons to write good words.

And I started this process, as Jon said, at MCC and MDC, where I worked very hard to expend myself to become a better person and a better professional and where I also helped other people in here who needed help, either learning English, or mathematics, or even help them help start a business as soon

as they will be out of here.

When my sentence is over, I will work even harder at giving back to the people in my life and helping those in need, giving back to society, and raising my children to become respectful, kind, and generous people in this world.

I want to finish by apologizing to your Honor, to the U.S. Government, and to anyone else affected by this case. I hope I can make amends. I ask for your leniency.

Thank you, your Honor.

THE COURT: Thank you, Mr. Lavidas.

Let me begin by just describing, very briefly, the evidence at trial and give context to my analysis of the arguments about the defendant's role.

Although the evidence at trial was largely circumstantial, it was overwhelming with respect to the defendant's guilt. Most of the critical facts were, of course, undisputed. The defendant's father was on the board of Ariad and had access to his most confidential information. The three announcements, which the insider trading anticipated, were material. Two of them were in 2013 and concerned FDA action on a major drug for the company; one in 2015 concerned an offer to acquire Ariad by Baxalta. Lavidas' very good friend, maybe one of his best friends, Mr. Nikas, engaged in significant trading in advance of each of these announcements. That friend was in an insider trading conspiracy with a man named Marc Demane

Debih. Demane and his network of traders made millions of dollars or avoided substantial losses from trading in advance of each of the three Ariad announcements. Lavidas was in near communication with both his father -- well, with his father and in frequent communication with Nikas.

The only issue that the defendant actually tried to put in dispute at trial was whether it was the defendant,

Mr. Lavidas, who actually tipped Nikas. The defendant offered an analysis of some of the trading and telephone calls to argue that the trading preceded the calls. The defense suggested that an investment banker in London at Centerview Partners may have been the source for the confidential information which went to Demane and then Nikas as opposed to the other way around.

This latter defense was premised on pure speculation and suffered from a fatal defect. The two 2013 announcements concerned FDA announcements, and Centerview had no access to that FDA activity. While Centerview may have had access to the 2015 information about the corporate takeover, its lack of access to the 2013 confidential information largely eviscerated the strength of any speculation about Centerview being the source of the tip in 2015.

Second, Demane testified at trial that his only source for tips about Ariad came from Nikas. He was entirely credible on this point. Indeed, Nikas shorted stock in 2013 when he

learned that the FDA planned to remove a critical leukemia drug from the market. All of his other insider trading involved taking long positions.

In sum, the evidence of Mr. Nikas' guilt was overwhelming, and the jury's verdict was well supported.

With that as background, let's go to the argument about a role adjustment. 3B1.2 allows role adjustment for both a minor and a minimal participant. The defendant seeks a decrease of four levels in the sentencing guidelines analysis based on the defendant's minimal participation.

In order to assess this argument, I have to assess whether the defendant has shown that he played a part in committing the offense that makes him substantially less culpable than the average participant in the criminal activity. Of course, I'm looking here at only that criminal conduct in which the defendant was personally involved. It is only that conduct on which the sentencing guidelines range has been calculated here.

I may consider whether or not, when guidelines range is driven in part by a loss amount, whether that loss amount greatly exceeds the defendant's personal gain or whether the defendant had limited knowledge of the scope of the scheme. If either of those are true, they may support an adjustment.

I am also guided by the sentencing guidelines to look at a number of factors since this is a fact-based

determination. They include the degree to which the defendant understood the scope and structure of the activity, the degree to which he participated in planning or organizing it, the degree to which he exercised decision-making authority or influenced the exercise of decision-making authority, the nature and extent of his participation, including acts that he performed and the responsibility and discretion that he had in performing those acts, and the degree to which he stood to benefit.

I must keep in mind -- and defense counsel has reinforced this -- that the fact that the defendant has performed an essential or indispensable role is not determinative.

Now, for a minimal participant, the guidelines cautions that it is intended to cover defendants who are plainly among the least culpable of those involved in the conduct. And taking that admonition, I have considered the defendant's motion in the following way:

I have already described for the record what the jury found in returning its verdict of guilty, both of the defendant's knowledge and intent and also his father's knowledge and intent. And the jury charge with respect to personal benefit described a finding of personal benefit broadly. It included an instruction that a personal benefit may be intangible and it need not be pecuniary in nature. It

can be simply the intention to confer a benefit on the recipients of the information. There were multiple ways in which the jury was charged in this regard, but the defendant, in his argument, has emphasized, I believe, that part of the jury charge.

I find that the defendant's decision to tip Nikas here was part of a family affair. It's not disputed that he is exceedingly close with his father, and the trial evidence permitted the jury to find that. The letters submitted on the defendant's behalf reinforce that.

During the period 2013 to 2015, when the insider trading was going on, Greece was suffering economically, to put it mildly, and the defendant's father, although very wealthy, was having a liquidity crisis. He began borrowing from Ariad's CEO in January 2012 and continued to do so periodically through at least December 2015. There were two loans extended in September and December 2013, right around the time of the first two tipping schemes.

I cannot find, based on this record, that a role adjustment is appropriate. The defendant understood this scope and structure of his criminal activity. He had the power to halt the entire scheme. Whether Lavidas, the defendant, suggested the scheme to his father or vice versa, he was certainly an equal partner with his father in the scheme in which they both anticipated benefiting.

He also, the defendant, played a critical role. Nikas was his friend. The defendant knew Nikas was an active securities trader. He had -- that is, the defendant had -- every reason to expect that Nikas' trading would involve large sums of money.

To make this scheme work, the defendant had to act with expedition, and he did so.

I cannot find that he is substantially less culpable than the average participant. His culpability far extends beyond him playing a minimal, but indispensable role in this activity.

The defendant has argued that the crime was a misguided act of friendship to Nikas, that the defendant tipped Nikas on a few occasions as part of a selfless, but misguided effort to help a friend for the mutual benefit of a continued friendship and their overlapping business interests, that the defendant had limited knowledge of the scheme, and that the defendant had a limited function.

I do not find any of those statements made in the sentencing submission to accurately describe the evidence at trial.

Let me turn to what is more important here, though, in every way, and that is the 3553(a) factors, because whatever the sentencing guidelines would be in this case, whether it is as calculated by the PSR or even if there would be a minimal

role adjustment, as the defendant argues for, I will be imposing a sentence far below the lowest level under either calculation.

So, who is the defendant?

He submitted 144 letters. I read each of them. There were at least a dozen that were particularly important to me in my analysis and understanding of the defendant and the appropriate sentence here, but each one of them has been considered by me.

There is also a description of the defendant contained in the PSR, and I have considered that as well.

Based on everything that's been argued to me and that I have read, I find that the defendant was born into a wealthy, privileged Greek family. The family business, Lavipharm, was founded in 1911. He is his parents' only son and was trained from an early age to succeed his father in running the business. He is devoted to Lavipharm and its employees, and has done many acts of kindness for those employees. From an early age, he was perceived as being mature beyond his years. He is a kind person, he is empathetic, he is a modest man, he is a caring man. He is devoted to his family and exceptionally close to them, including to his father. He is a wonderful and generous friend to many, many friends. He is a caring husband and a devoted father.

He was born in New York and came to the United States

for college. Between 2012 and 2018, roughly, he tried to make his own way as an entrepreneur in New York and created a health bar business named Mediterra. When that venture failed, he returned to the family business.

Following his arrest, he has been incarcerated in the MCC. He has shown exceptional character while incarcerated. He has assisted his fellow inmates. He wrote a children's book for his daughter to help her cope with his absence.

After his trial, he was moved to the MDC, and he has suffered there, as have other inmates, from the restrictions implemented in response to the pandemic and, mostly recently, in response to a security issue that arose in the institution.

I'm pausing for a moment to look at notes that I made from counsel's arguments to me and the defendant's statement, to make sure, I don't want to add something beyond what I've already said.

I think it's clear, from what I've already said, that I don't find that the defendant is less culpable than the average participant. The engagement on three separate occasions, in the way that I described, shows the kind of knowing and intentional behavior that the law should, and does, punish. It's involvement that was far beyond just being an essential cog in a scheme.

I do find that the fact that the defendant's experience in prison has been very difficult because of the

lockdown relevant and important for me to consider.

I've also considered the variety of sentences imposed. Of course, in each case, a judge does their best to apply the 3553(a) factors, does their best to avoid unwarranted disparity, does their best to fashion a sentence based on the individual before them, and the criminal conduct involved.

So, let me turn to some of the additional findings I must make in weighing the 3553(a) factors.

No one is suggesting here that insider trading isn't a serious crime. It is. It's a difficult crime to prosecute, and particularly difficult when it's part of an international scheme, as this was. Many critical witnesses and defendants are beyond the reach of American prosecutors, but it is the American market and the integrity of that market that suffers. The integrity of the American stock market, and our securities markets generally, are important to our nation, and that's why we have the laws we have with respect to insider trading and violations of other securities regulations.

So, the issue of general deterrence and appropriate punishment both strongly support a serious term of imprisonment here.

The defendant has not expressed remorse; he has not acknowledged any wrongdoing. At the end of his statement to me, he said he wished to find vindication through doing good works. He apologized, in a general way, and said he wished to

make amends, but I have not heard a straightforward statement acknowledging his criminal activity or expressing remorse for helping his father breach his father's fiduciary duty to his company by using, very intentionally, information about that company's situation to allow an active securities trader to benefit, to whatever extent that trader wanted to, from that material nonpublic information.

There is an aspect here of the father's breach of his fiduciary duty to his company, and the defendant's knowledge that his father was doing that in making these three tips over the course of 2013 and 2015, that is deeply troubling. If it hadn't been -- enough said on that.

I also want to acknowledge, however, that I don't expect that either the defendant or his father are likely to be in a position to commit insider trading again in any way that would affect the U.S. stock market. He has already — that is, the defendant — paid a very steep price for doing so with respect to Ariad.

I have no reason to believe that the issue of individual deterrence should play any significant role in deciding this sentence.

As I've said already, a sentence of either 63 months in prison or 41 months in prison is not appropriate in this case, and I have considered both guidelines ranges in deciding what sentence to impose here.

I've also considered the other sentences, because I must avoid unwarranted disparity; the other sentences, that is, that counsel have directed my attention to.

So, what is the range that I think is important for me to consider?

So, I think a sentence of 24 months' imprisonment could be appropriate, I think a sentence of 18 months' imprisonment could be appropriate, I think a sentence of a year and a day could be appropriate. And I think a sentence of time served is not appropriate, considering all the 3553(a) factors.

I think that the sentence, if we weren't in the midst of the pandemic, and if the defendant had not been experiencing the situation that he has in prison, and if he hadn't shown the character in responding to that situation, I don't know what sentence I would have imposed, whether it would have been 18 months or 24 months, but I can't ignore how difficult this time is, for reasons that have nothing to do with the defendant's criminal culpability. And I was deeply impressed by the fact that the defendant, who responded to these very difficult circumstances, responded in a way that was so positive, and it really is part of the way he has lived his life. He tried to help others, he tried to help his fellow inmates, he tried to help his daughter. And that is part and parcel of his character.

And based on that, and all of that, I am going to

impose a term of imprisonment of a year and a day.

I have additional components of the sentence to

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I will order restitution as described in the consent order and as amended to our discussion earlier today.

I impose a term of supervised release of three years.

The defendant must comply with the standard conditions of supervised release and pay restitution.

He must also submit to a reasonable search. He is to provide the probation department access to any and all requested financial information. He shall not incur any credit card charge or open any new credit lines without approval of the probation department.

I'm sorry, Mr. Streeter cannot hear me. We'll just pause for a moment while I wait to see if he can indicate he can hear me. It's 1:02.

Mr. Lavidas, can you still hear me?

THE DEFENDANT: Yes, your Honor.

THE COURT: And can the government still hear me?

MR. TRACER: Yes, your Honor.

(Pause)

THE COURT: I am watching Mr. Streeter on the video link as he apparently is trying to gain access to audio -- regain access to audio.

Mr. Rogers, are you still with us?

(212) 805-0300

1	(Pause)
2	THE COURT: Ms. Rojas, are you with us?
3	THE DEPUTY CLERK: I am, your Honor.
4	THE COURT: Please communicate by email with
5	Mr. Streeter to see if there's anything we can do to help him,
6	and please contact Mr. Rogers.
7	THE DEPUTY CLERK: Will do.
8	(Pause)
9	THE COURT: Mr. Streeter, are you able to hear me yet?
10	MR. TRACER: Your Honor, can you hear me?
11	THE COURT: I can hear you, Mr. Tracer.
12	MR. TRACER: Okay.
13	So, Mr. Streeter called me and I put him on speaker
14	next to my phone, and if he can hear me, this may be a pass
15	that works for now.
16	THE COURT: Mr. Streeter, are you able to hear me?
17	MR. STREETER: Yes. I think you're going to have to
18	take your headphones out and put both phones on speaker.
19	MR. TRACER: Okay. How about now?
20	THE COURT: Mr. Streeter, can you hear me?
21	MR. STREETER: I can't hear the Court. I can hear
22	you. Unplug your headphones.
23	MR. TRACER: Okay. I've just done that.
24	MR. STREETER: Put both phones on speaker.
25	MR. TRACER: Okay, done.

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THE COURT: Mr. Streeter, are you able to hear me? 1 2 MR. STREETER: I can now, yes, your Honor. Thank you. 3 I'm sorry, I don't know what -- my phone just cut out. 4 It's not my phone, it's something else happened, I don't know 5 what, but I was just terminated from the call about three 6 minutes ago. 7 THE COURT: Thank you. It's now 1:11. I was listing the conditions of supervised release. 8 9 I'm happy to go back as far as I need to, to fill you in, 10 Mr. Streeter. 11 When did you lose audio connection? 12 MR. STREETER: I didn't hear the sentence that just 13 got announced. 14 THE COURT: Okay. 15 I announced a sentence of one year and one day, to be followed by a term of supervised release of three years. 16 17 Do I need to go back further, Mr. Streeter? MR. STREETER: No. I'll see the transcript. 18 19 Thank you, your Honor. 20 THE COURT: The three years of supervised release has 21 the following conditions: The standard conditions of 22 supervised release, the requirement that the defendant pay 23 restitution as described in the earlier portion of this 24 proceeding, the condition that the defendant submit to a

reasonable search, that the defendant provide the probation

department access to any and all requested financial information, that the defendant not incur any new credit card charge or open any new credit lines without approval of the probation department, that he perform community service at the rate of 100 hours for each of the three years of supervised release in a way that is approved by the probation department, that he be supervised by the district of his residence, that he pay a special assessment of \$700, that he pay a fine of \$50,000.

And I don't believe -- I know there are no open counts.

Let me ask, counsel, do you know of any legal reason why I cannot impose the sentence I have just described as stated?

I'll ask the government first. Mr. Tracer?

MR. TRACER: No, your Honor.

THE COURT: Mr. Streeter?

MR. STREETER: No, your Honor.

THE COURT: I order the sentence I have described on the record to be imposed as stated.

I need to advise the defendant of his right to appeal.

If you're unable to pay the costs of an appeal, you may apply for leave to appeal in forma pauperis. Any notice of appeal must be filed within 14 days of the judgment of conviction.

1 Mr. Tracer, is there anything else that we need to do? MR. TRACER: No, your Honor. 2 3 THE COURT: Mr. Streeter, is there anything else that 4 we need to do? 5 MR. STREETER: I know I went to trial on a superseding 6 indictment. I thought that ordinarily the underlying 7 indictment would be dismissed under those circumstances. MR. TRACER: I agree with that. 8 9 THE COURT: So, the underlying indictment is dismissed 10 as to this defendant. 11 Anything else, Mr. Streeter? 12 MR. STREETER: Not that I can think of, no, your 13 Honor. 14 THE COURT: And, Mr. Lavidas, were you able to hear my 15 instruction as to your right to appeal? 16 THE DEFENDANT: I did, your Honor. 17 THE COURT: Okay. Thank you, all, and thank you for your submissions and 18 19 assistance in this sentence. Thank you. 20 MR. TRACER: Thank you, your Honor. * * * 21 22 23 24 25